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31 Introduction
Following the continuous development of information technology, retail payment systems
have been in clear evolution in the last years. Cash is no longer the unique possibility of
making a payment and shares relevance with other instruments like cards, direct debits
or some other electronic means. Accordingly, managers of ﬁnancial institutions and other
professionals are very interested in knowing how consumers make payments in their daily
operations. This evolution has also attracted the attention of ﬁnancial authorities in two
respects. First, because one of their responsibilities is to promote eﬃciency and security in
the use of payment instruments and in the payment system as a whole (European Central
Bank (ECB), 2010). Second, since this development aﬀects cash demand and therefore
money supply, it could have implications for monetary policy.
The evolution of retail payments diﬀers across countries (Humphrey et al., 1996,
Humphrey et al., 2001, Humphrey, 2004, Callado and Utrero, 2004). The literature
on payment systems has focused mainly on price and non-price characteristics and incen-
tives as drivers of these diﬀerences. However, major divergences in payment composition
between Western Europe, the US and Japan are not due only to price or cost, but are
also the result of important disparities in these countries’ technological innovations, ge-
ographical size or culture (Humphrey, 2010). These discrepancies, for instance, explain
the reason why Europe has a well-established nationwide electronic payment system while
the US continues to rely importantly on checks. Further, apart from Markose and Loke
(2003), most money demand models only use interest rates and income to measure the
consumers demand for cash and do not consider the fact that the existence of new tech-
nology could signiﬁcantly reduce the demand for cash, Scholnick et al. (2006). There are
some interesting contributions, however, that analyze the eﬀect of technological innova-
tions in banking, in particular, automatic teller machine networks in consumers’ decisions
(Snellman and Virén, 2006, Ferrari et al., 2007 and Yang and Ching, 2010). Together with
these factors, institutional environment and national regulations shape ﬁnancial market
design (La Porta et al., 1997) and may as well have an inﬂuence on payment system devel-
opment and usage. In fact, codes related to international bodies, such as the Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems, serve as a guide to develop sound ﬁnancial systems
(BIS, 1994). To the best of our knowledge institutional factors have not been included in
the analysis of payment systems.
This paper tries to ﬁll this gap by focusing on institutional and technological char-
acteristics both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. In particular, the paper
analyzes how the process of entering an economic and monetary union and the inﬂuence
of new institutions could shape the evolution of consumers’ payments in newly acceded
countries (NAC). The conclusions of the theoretical analysis are then tested on the par-
ticular case of European Union (EU) expansion, accession of Eastern European countries.
This context is particularly challenging because the enlargement process has proven to be
successful in providing institution’s building and structural transformation to Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (Dabrowski and Radziwill, 2007). On May 1st, 2004 the EU welcomed
10 more countries as a part of its largest enlargement ever. The accession of the new
members increased the EU population by nearly 20% but the EU’s total gross domestic
product (GDP) increased just 4% (Hildebrandt, 2002).1 The NAC accession negotiations
1Including Romania and Bulgaria that entered in 2007.
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4required the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the set of laws that underpin
the common market. As a result, NAC ﬁnancial systems were expected to be transformed
to such an extent that the supervisory and legal framework will reach more or less EU
standards. Moreover, EU ﬁnancial sector has also been experiencing a profound change -
deregulation, disintermediation, technological change and single currency - representing,
in fact a moving target to the NAC’s authorities (Stirbu, 2004).
These countries are also expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) and
adopt the single currency Euro, which will also aﬀect the way payments are made, both
large value and retail ones. Nowadays, the use of payment instruments in NAC diﬀers
from the uses and customs of EU15 (Callado and Utrero, 2007). In this setting, it is
important to remark that security, reliability and eﬃciency are critical features for new
payment solutions to be adopted. Therefore, the priority of NAC is to develop modern,
robust and eﬃcient market infrastructures which serve the needs of their economies and
facilitate the development of safe and eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets.2 As part of the EU, these
countries must also participate and work in the adaptation of their payment systems to
Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA), see ECB-SEPA (2010), and follow the guidelines of
the European Central Bank with respect to both retail payment systems and instruments
(BIS, 2005). The inherent changes of this process involve an economic eﬀort on the part
of the institutions and of the ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
In light of the above discussion, the ﬁrst objective of the paper is to develop a theoret-
ical model that can describe the eﬀects that the accession to an economic and monetary
union can have on household payment choice and intermediation costs. We assume that
consumers have two ways of acquiring consumption goods, cash and electronic payments,
and that technology is crucial for the development of the payment system. Our theoret-
ical model builds on Ireland (1994a) and Hromcová (2008). We use a learning-by-doing
setup with proportional intermediation cost. Knowledge improvement leads to more so-
phisticated payment system and cheaper electronic transactions. That makes agents in
a more developed economy use more electronic payments than in a less developed one.
In the process of accession, the less developed economy (accessing country) gradually
adapts to the payment system of the more developed economy (accepting country). As a
consequence, agents’ payment choice approaches the one of the consumers in the country
with more developed payment system. The second objective of the paper is to estimate
the results of the model. For that, we use data on EU payment systems for countries
accessing in 2004 and those accepting the NACs. Furthermore, data availability allows
us to study the joint eﬀect of institutional environment and banking market structure on
payment decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2These countries started the design and implementation of new payment systems in the late 90’s
following the objectives relating to the integration in the EU (ECB, 1999).
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52 Theoretical Model
We will consider two economies which diﬀer in the initial level of development. At the be-
ginning they are two separated islands and can have diﬀerent monetary policies. With the
accession moment approaching, their monetary policies must converge and at the moment
of accession a common monetary policy applies in both islands. After the uniﬁcation takes
place, the accessing country is gradually adopting the payment system technology of the
more developed one. They maintain their own structure and other variables unchanged
otherwise. Technology level is crucial for the payment system. The higher the technology
achieved, the cheaper the non-cash payments. As a measure of technology, we will use
the level of capital in the sense of the learning-by-doing model, Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995). Because the learning-by-doing model can be reduced to an AK model, for sim-
plicity of our theoretical setup, we assume that the production function has the linear
form. However, we keep reminding the reader that the level of capital is the measure of
achieved knowledge, and higher knowledge leads to higher technological level.
2.1 Accessing country
2.1.1 Household Problem
In the description of the model we follow closely Ireland (1994a) and Hromcová (2008).
The behavior of households in both islands is analogous. Both economies consist of a
large number of inﬁnitely lived households. All households have identical preferences,
production and trade opportunities. Therefore, we present the model for the island which
begins with lower level of technology and at the end of the section we generalize the model
for the other island.
Households inhabit the following environment: they face continuum of spatially sepa-
rated markets, which are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. All households live in market 0, and the
index j indicates the distance from home. In each market j a distinct perishable good is
produced and sold in every period. Goods are thus indexed by j, which corresponds to the









where β is the discount factor, ct(j) is deﬁned as the consumption at period t of the good
produced in market j, u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, with limt→∞u′ [ct(j)] = ∞.
The production and trade is like in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each household is
composed of a worker-shopper pair. Prior to any trading, government ﬁxes the level of
the gross nominal interest rate Rt+1 between periods t and t + 1. We will assume that
Rt+1 > 1. Agents enter the period t with certain amount of monetary balances Zt and the
debt Bt, carried over from the previous period, and the capital stock kt that represents
the technology level achieved. A representative worker decides to produce on any of the
markets j via the net production function
yt = Akt (2)
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6where A is the net productivity of capital.3
First, the goods market opens and consumption takes place. Worker stays at the
market j during the whole period. Shopper visits various markets to acquire consumption
goods carrying all the monetary balances of the household.
Two ways of acquiring consumption goods are allowed: using money or electronic
payments. All goods purchased with government issued money will be referred to as cash
goods. Goods purchased via electronic payments will be referred to as electronic goods.
Nominal monetary balances Zt can be used to buy goods in some of the markets
indexed by j. Cash purchases are subject to the liquidity constraint
  1
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where ξt(j) = 0 if a good is purchased on market j with cash, or ξt(j) = 1 if a good is
purchased on market j via an electronic payment and pt is the price level.
As said above, agents can use an electronic payment to pay for the consumption.
The ﬁnancial intermediary enables electronic payments at a cost γt(j) that is given for
each market j and period t. The part of output that is not consumed is devoted to the
investment into capital. After the goods market closes, the monetary holdings of agents
are augmented by a lump sum transfer Xt from the government. The amount Xt is
endogenously determined in the system according to the given nominal interest rate, so
that the money demand is totally satisﬁed. As the next step, the securities market opens.
During the securities trading session households choose their currency holdings Zt+1. They
also purchase (or issue) one-period nominally denominated pure discount bonds paying
Bt+1 units of money at period t + 1 while they cost
Bt+1
Rt+1
units of money at period t.
Bonds are in zero net supply. The budget constraint agents are facing can be written
  1
0

















We assume that the intermediation cost must be paid by the buyer, as motivated in
Ireland (1994b). To be able to purchase without cash, some resources must be devoted
to making the non-cash payment itself available such as checking the identity of the
buyer or his ability to pay. When the shopper is far away from home (market zero) the
communication becomes more diﬃcult, and therefore we assume that the payment to the
intermediary increases with j. The process of learning-by-doing gives a potential for the
development of new technologies. It also leads to an increase in income per worker and
3Thanks to the AK technology, we can write the net production function as
yt = (A′ + 1 − δ)kt.
It corresponds to the one deﬁned in the equation (2), where A′ is the marginal productivity and δ is the
depreciation of capital.
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7higher consumption. Higher purchase means that checking the ability of the buyer to pay
is more relevant. The development and diﬀusion of new technologies allows to decrease
the processing costs.
The real payment made to the intermediary is characterized by a function that fulﬁlls
properties found in some empirical studies, as described in Hromcová (2008): the interme-
diation cost is lower in richer countries, the cost of intermediated payment diminishes over
time, and the cost elasticity is close to zero, i.e. the cost is proportional to consumption





The time independent part of the payment, γlocation(j) is strictly increasing with the
distance from home, strictly convex, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and similarly to
Ireland (1994a) we assume
γ
location(0) = 0 and lim
j→1γ
location(j) = ∞. (6)
The function γtechnology(kt) is strictly decreasing, strictly convex, twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and limt→∞γtechnology(kt) = 0. The time dependent part of the intermediation
cost, γtechnology(kt), embodies the eﬀect of new technologies on the cost. It includes the
state of the technology frontier as well as the net of electronic infrastructures to perform
the electronic payments. This cost decreases as the level of technology develops. The
more capital is accumulated, the more knowledge is available, better technologies can be
developed and cheaper intermediation services can be oﬀered. The other time dependent
part of the intermediation cost, γconsumption [ct(j)], is increasing, linear in consumption
and γconsumption(0) = 0.
We thus concentrate directly on the eﬀect of new technologies on the intermediation
cost. However, the scale economies are also present, because higher stock of knowledge is
associated with higher volume of transactions.
2.1.3 Payment choice
Consider a given level of kt. The cost of cash goods is the same in all markets, it cor-
responds to the nominal interest rate. The cost of electronic goods increases with the
distance from home, taking into account the assumption on the time independent part of
the intermediation cost γlocation(·), equation (6). Whenever Rt+1 > 1, there will exist at
each time t an interval of markets where the intermediation cost for electronic purchases
is lower that the nominal interest rate, and an interval where it is higher. Therefore, there
will exist a market with cutoﬀ index st ∈ (0,1), such that in all markets with indexes
j < st consumers will use electronic payments and in all markets with indexes j ≥ st
consumers will use cash to acquire the consumption goods. Thus households will choose
cash goods in markets far away from home (market 0) and electronic goods in markets
close to home. In the cutoﬀ market consumers are indiﬀerent between using cash or
electronic payments. We arbitrarily assume that cash will be used at the cutoﬀ market.
In our speciﬁcation the level of new knowledge increases over time. Changes in kt aﬀect
the payment to intermediary related to technology γtechnology(kt). Technology development
6
8and interest rate are thus factors that aﬀect the cutoﬀ index st. We illustrate the eﬀect
of technology development and monetary policy on the cutoﬀ market in Figure 1.





t(j) when ξt(j) = 0,
c1
t(j) when ξt(j) = 1.
The functions c0
t(j) and c1
t(j) characterize the cash and electronic consumption per mar-
ket j, respectively. We can then write the utility function, budget and cash-in-advance






























































Deﬁnition: Given the set of initial conditions k1, Z1, B1, p1 and the sequence of nominal
interest rates {Rt+1}
∞
t=0 , the equilibrium consists of sequences {c0
t(j), c1
t(j), kt+1, Zt+1,
Bt+1, st, Xt, pt+1}∞
t=1 such that
(a) a representative household is maximizing the discounted utility (7) subject to
the budget constraint (8) and the cash-in-advance constraint (9), choosing the sequences
{c0
t(j), c1
t(j), kt+1, Zt+1, Bt+1, st}∞
t=1,














γt(j)dj + kt+1. (10)
Zt+1 = Zt + Xt, (11)
Bt+1 = 0. (12)
Let λt and ηt be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget
constrain (8) and the cash-in-advance constraints (9), respectively. The equations that
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Figure 1: (a) Eﬀect of technology development on cutoﬀ market: setting the nominal
interest factor constant, Rt = Rt+1 = R, and assuming that kt+1 > kt, we can observe
that st+1 > st; (b) Eﬀect of monetary policy on cutoﬀ market: setting the capital level
constant, kt+1 = kt, and assuming that Rt+1 > Rt, we can observe that st+1 > st.
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10(11), (12) and the ﬁrst order conditions on consumption, capital, nominal balances, nom-














































+ (λt + ηt)c
0
t(st). (18)
















From the ﬁrst order condition (18) we get the payment to the intermediary to be paid


















0 (Rt,λt) − c
1 (λt). (21)
Taking into account the expressions (19), (20), and (5), the equilibrium on the goods












γt(j)dj + kt+1. (22)
The current period output is spent between cash consumption, electronic consumption,
payment to the intermediary and investment. The real monetary balances, which equal
the amount of cash consumption purchased in all markets, are







The consumption via ﬁnancial intermediaries, which equal the amount of electronic con-
sumption purchased in all markets, is
et = s(Rt,kt) c
1 (λt). (25)
Thus the ratio of cash and electronic payments is dependent on the speciﬁcation of the in-
termediation function, speciﬁcation of the utility and the monetary policy in the previous
period.
8
11In order to see the behavior of the cash to electronic payments ratio we set up a





lnc for θ = 1, and
c1−θ−1
1−θ for θ  = 1
where θ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the following
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 for θ  = 1.
(28)
The cutoﬀ index describes the proportion of markets in which agents employ services of the
intermediary. From (15) we can get the evolution of the marginal utility of consumption,
we can see that its growth rate is constant over time. The ratio of cash to electronic










The technology level (the part of the intermediation cost function that depends on the
technology) and the monetary policy aﬀect the composition of the payment methods as


















The speciﬁcation of the accessing and accepting economy is the same. When writing the
version of the model for the accepting country we use the analogous notation, substituting
lower-case letters for capital letters and capital letters for blackboard bold ones, i.e. the
level of technology in the accepting country will be denoted as Kt, the nominal interest
factor between t and t + 1 as Rt+1.
4The time independent part γlocation(j) is taken from Ireland (1994a).
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122.3 Accessing Economy Before and After
Both economies know both initial conditions and when the accession takes place, i.e.
Taccess is given. Both economies can solve their respective maximization problems as
all information is available to everyone. After the accession, the accessing economy is
adopting the payment technology of the accepting country. We deﬁne kaccess
t as the level of
technology that determines the intermediation cost at each market after accession. Given
that the accessing country’s payment technology converges to the accepting one, the gap
between the payment technologies of both countries will be diminished over time. The
evolution of kaccess
t will reﬂect the payment technology diﬀerences and will be a function









where kt ≤ kaccess
t < Kt, kaccess
Taccess = kTaccess, limt→∞kaccess
t = Kt and kt denotes the level
of capital in an economy that evolves independently of the accepting country because it
does (did) not access, kaccess
t accounts for the payment technology (capital) in the country
where the accession actually happened, and Kt is the level of capital in the accepting
country.5 The intermediation cost function would be slightly modiﬁed and the ratio
between the cash and electronic consumptions after the accession, equation (29), depends
















Equation (31) implies that for given levels of payment technologies and a given monetary
policy, any decrease in the real balances will have to be accompanied by an increase in the
electronic goods. It also implies that the accession, that means higher level of payment
technology, kaccess
t > kt, induces a drop in the ratio of cash and electronic payments, ﬁrst
element in (30).
3 Empirical analysis
According to equation (31) of the model, the use of alternative means of payment in the
accessing countries is a function of the monetary policy as well as the technology level
in the accessing and accepting countries. We interpret kt (Kt) as the level of technology
achieved and as the set of infrastructures developed to make payments. In order to
empirically estimate this relationship, we take logs. Therefore, the baseline speciﬁcation
to estimate is
ln(mit/eit) = α0 + α1(Rit − 1) + α2 ln(kit/Kt) + εit (32)
where xit represents a variable x in the accessing country i at time t, where x = m/e,
R − 1, k/K are cash to electronic operations (dependent variable), nominal interest rate,
5An example of a convergence equation could be found in Lucas (2009).
10
13and the ratio of payment technology level in the accessing countries to the payment
technology level in the accepting countries (thus no index i), respectively. The error term
εit is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2, εit ∼ N(0,σ2).
The estimation takes into account the possible existence of non observable heterogeneity.
From the econometric point of view, the estimation of the coeﬃcients, α0, α1 and α2
should take into account the structure of the components of the error term εit, that is,
the speciﬁc eﬀects can be treated as ﬁxed or random. If the eﬀects are independent of
the explanatory variables they form part of the error term, that in this case will be a
compound term. When there is no correlation, the random eﬀects are used since it is the
most eﬃcient alternative (Arellano and Bover, 1990), otherwise the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator
is used. To test whether the eﬀects are ﬁxed or random, the Hausman statistic is used.
3.1 Data
We use panel data from the EU Eastern enlargement (2004-2007). In 2004 Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
joined the EU and Bulgaria and Romania were proposed for a later acceptance.6 In order
to have pre-accessing and post-accessing periods we take the period between 1996-2009.
Data come from Eurostat and European Central Bank. Data on EU-15 and EMU is
also available.7 To allow for comparisons, all variables are expressed in euros and scaled
by population.8 We use data on cash and cards to account for the ratio of cash and
non-cash operations (dependent variable). Short term (3-months) interest rate accounts
for monetary policy as in Rinaldi (2001), among others. To proxy for the technology
level achieved in the payment systems, we use two alternative variables widely used in
the retail payment systems literature (Humphrey, 2010): per capita Automatic Teller
Machines (ATM) and per capita Electronic Fund Transfers at Point of Sale (EFT-POS).
The model suggests that both accessing and accepting level of technology aﬀect payment
operations. To operationalize this, the technology level achieved by accessing countries
is divided by the average technology level of the accepting group. This ratio approaches
the unity when accessing countries approach the accepting group. The benchmark case is
the comparison between accessing countries and the EU-15, but since there is individual
information on EMU countries, we estimate the model comparing accessing and EMU
countries as well.
The model suggests that the institutional environment inﬂuences payment decisions.
Accordingly, we introduce two alternative variables to capture the eﬀect of accessing
the EU. First, the candidate variable identiﬁes the moment when the country received
candidate status and oﬃcial membership negotiations with Brussels started. Second, the
accessing variable captures the moment when the country ﬁnally acceded.9
We also introduce a proxy for economic level (GDP per worker) to control for de-
velopment and economic stability. Previous empirical papers (Humphrey, 2004, among
6From now on, when we refer to accessing countries we include all of them.
7EU-15 are Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, Den-
mark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden (in membership order). Great Britain,
Denmark and Sweden are not part of the EMU.
8All variables are expressed in logs.
9In the estimation we take into account when the countries became members and therefore, from that
moment in time, they are included in the accepting group.
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14others) ﬁnd a positive relationship between economic development and electronic means
of payments. Table 1 collects the deﬁnitions of the main variables and presents some
descriptive statistics.
[insert table 1 around here]
The two columns present the mean and the standard deviation for all accessing coun-
tries and for accepting countries (EU-15), respectively. Some interesting diﬀerences are
evidenced between both sets of countries and all diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.
First, the per capita currency in circulation in the accepting countries nearly doubles
that of the accessing ones. This preliminary positive relationship is in line with previous
evidence such as Drehmann et al. (2002), among others. Observing the other means of
payment, accepting countries present higher level of card operations. In this case, ac-
cepting countries card operations are nearly four times the operations processed in their
accessing counterparts. Accepting countries present also higher per capita EFT-POS and
ATM, suggesting that the technology applied to payment systems is more widespread and
developed than in accessing countries. If we look at the evolution along the period, it
can be observed that card use and ATM per capita in both groups of countries exhibit
an increasing trend and we can conclude that the accessing countries are heading towards
the accepting ones, see Figure 2. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the main
variables. Some pairwise correlations are very high (5 out of 21 are greater than 60%),
especially ATM and EFT-POS present a correlation of 83%. To avoid multicollinearity
problems, we do not include both variables together.
[insert ﬁgure 2 around here]
[insert table 2 around here]
3.2 Results
Results for the benchmark case are presented in Table 3, panel A. Hausman test is pre-
sented at the end of the table. The test rejects the correlation of the eﬀects in all runs
and consequently, the random eﬀect estimator is used.
[insert table 3 around here]
We introduce ATM and EFT-POS variables one at a time. Further, the accessing and
the candidate variable are introduced separately, except for the last two runs, columns
5 and 6. Both ATM and EFT-POS present a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. This
indicates that the higher the value of the ratio (the closer accessing payment technology to
the European one), the lesser use of cash, as expected from the results of the model. This
result is consistent throughout the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. EFT-POS coeﬃcient conﬁrms
previous evidence that developed and widespread point of sale terminal networks reduce
cash demand and use. Previous results on ATM are more inconclusive, some studies
report a negative eﬀect of ATM on cash use, whereas others present a positive eﬀect
(Stix, 2004). Our results are in line with the former. For example, Boeschoten (1992)
12
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Pccurrency  657.1531 1249.556 
(per capita currency in circulation)  (704.4418) (286.4857) 
Pccardop  13.9415 52.5298 
(per capita card operations) (20.2578)  (4.5398) 
Pceftpos  0.0063 0.01169 
(per capita point of sale terminals)  (0.0068) (0.0041) 
Pcatm  0.0003 0.0006 
(per capita atm terminals) (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
Pwgdp  18543.76       56978.71    
(per worker gdp) (10389.13)  (  2571.081) 
Irate  9.1054 3.0125 
(money market interest rate) (14.8071)  (0.5011) 
Note: mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are reported. 







Table 2: Correlations. 
 
 Atm  Eft-pos  Interest  rate  GDP  Accessing  Candidate 
Atm 1.0000         
Eft-pos 0.8328*  1.0000        
Interest rate  -0.6417*  -0.6205*  1.0000       
GDP 0.7521*  0.7965*  -0.5205*  1.0000    
Accessing 0.4327*  0.3711*  -0.4374*  0.5443*  1.0000   
Candidate 0.4739*  0.2460*  -0.4404*  0.3426*  0.4201*  1.0000 
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Figure 2: Relationship between technology (the number of automatic teller machines
per capita) and the usage of cards (per capita card operations) in the accepting and
accessing countries over the analyzed period.
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Table 3: Basic Specification. 
  
Panel A: Accepting Group European Union. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm  -0.3792***  -0.4675***  -0.3792***  
  [0.0742]  [0.0756]  [0.0743]  
Eft-pos   -0.4722***  -0.5416***  -0.4722*** 
   [0.0573]  [0.0567]  [0.0573] 
Interest  rate  0.3414*** 0.1791** 0.3870*** 0.1910** 0.3415*** 0.1791** 
  [0.0768] [0.0720] [0.0805] [0.0752] [0.0768] [0.0720] 
GDP -1.5284***  -1.0629***  -1.4293*** -0.9274*** -1.5284*** -1.0629*** 
  [0.2439] [0.2361] [0.2564] [0.2432] [0.2440] [0.2361] 
Accessing 0.9688***  0.7477***      0.9688***  0.7477*** 
 [0.2252]  [0.2023]      [0.2253]  [0.2023] 
Candidate      -0.1299  -1.6594*** -2.1828*** -2.0338*** 
      [0.2897] [0.3149] [0.3902] [0.3459] 
Constant  12.8996*** 8.4300*** 12.9427*** 9.4313*** 15.0825***  10.4638*** 
  [2.4846] [2.3950] [2.4475] [2.2496] [2.3694] [2.2972] 
Observations  168 168 168 168 168 168 
R2  0.62 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.66 
Hausman test 
 
9.43 6.36 5.85 1.77 9.26 6.37 
 
 
Panel B: Accepting Group European Monetary Union. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm  -0.3793***  -0.4680***  -0.3794***  
  [0.0743]  [0.0756]  [0.0743]  
Eft-pos   -0.4718***  -0.5412***  -0.4718*** 
   [0.0573]  [0.0567]  [0.0573] 
Interest  rate  0.3415*** 0.1792** 0.3871*** 0.1911** 0.3415*** 0.1792** 
  [0.0768] [0.0720] [0.0805] [0.0752] [0.0768] [0.0720] 
Gdp  -1.5285*** -1.0632*** -1.4293*** -0.9275*** -1.5285*** -1.0632*** 
  [0.2440] [0.2362] [0.2564] [0.2433] [0.2440] [0.2362] 
Accessing  0.9688*** 0.7478***      0.9688*** 0.7478*** 
  [0.2253]  [0.2023]    [0.2253]  [0.2023] 
Candidate     -0.4578  -0.6290**  -1.4567***  -2.2329*** 
      [0.3003] [0.2660] [0.3678] [0.3418] 
Constant  12.9669*** 8.2552*** 13.3529*** 8.1986*** 14.4236***  10.4880*** 
  [2.4789] [2.4073] [2.4162] [2.3207] [2.3030] [2.2962] 
Observations  168 168 168 168 168 168 
R2  0.63 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.66 
Hausman test 
 
9.43 6.36 6.59 5.48 9.32 6.36 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
19 18for the Netherlands, Snellman et al. (2000) for several European countries and Rinaldi
(2001) for Belgium, ﬁnd that the use of ATM reduces cash holdings and that the presence
of ATM together with EFT-POS has a negative eﬀect on outstanding money. These
negative eﬀects could be explained by the fact that the development of ATM improved
the access to cash, suggesting that people withdraw just the amount of cash needed for
small transactions in the near future, without the need to keep big amounts of money in
their wallet, Rinaldi (2001). In line with these results, Markose and Loke (2003) argue
that money demand functions began to break down in the late 1970s as a consequence of
new technologies, such as EFT-POS and ATM, being introduced. This evidence conﬁrms
the result of the theoretical model that the use of alternative means of payment not only
depends on a country’s own technological development but on the accepting countries
technology level as well. Further, this result agrees with Humphrey et al. (2001) who do
not ﬁnd evidence of a substitution eﬀect between ATM and EFT-POS.
Nominal interest rate, that accounts for the monetary policy, presents a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Hence, an increase in the interest rate implies an increase in cash
use with respect to card use. This result contradicts previous evidence that highlights
the negative relationship between cash and interest rates (Humphrey, 2004 and Snellman
and Virén, 2006, among others). However, along the analyzed period interest rates of
accessing countries followed macroeconomic stabilization policies in order to meet Eu-
ropean convergence criteria resulting in a continuous deep interest rate decrease, which
might have caused the observed behavior. Per worker GDP have a negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient, meaning that more developed countries present lower cash use, conﬁrming pre-
vious results on international comparisons (Callado and Utrero, 2004 and 2007). Looking
at the variables that account for the institutional environment, the candidate variable
presents a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient both when it is introduced alone and when
it is introduced together with the accession dummy. The prospects of entering the EU
have a positive eﬀect on card use. This may indicate that the expectation of accessing to
the EU is considered a positive shock for the reliability of the economic and the payment
systems. It also reﬂects the fact that implementation of new payment systems started
before ﬁnally entering the EU (ECB, 1999). On the other hand, accessing variable is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the membership moment impacts positively the use
of cash. A possible explanation is that the success of macroeconomic stabilization policies
and of ﬁnancial reforms developed during the candidate status, as membership conﬁrms,
make domestic liquid assets become again more and more attractive, pushing upwards the
ratio of broad money to GDP (Duchene et al., 2006). Therefore, economic level, monetary
policy but also technology and institutional environment matters in payment decisions.
The reference group used in the above analysis is EU-15. Afterwards, we repeat the
analysis using EMU countries as accepting group. EU membership has changed in the
last decade. However, it is the EMU participation that has presented more changes.
As in the previous analysis, we take into account the individual membership changes.
Results are presented in Table 3, panel B. Results conﬁrm previous evidence. Economic
level, monetary policy, payment system technology and institutional environment aﬀect
signiﬁcantly payment choices. Again, technology developments foster card use.
The results presented in table 3 should be taken with caution, since the potential
endogeneity of some of the variables have not been taken into account . This aspect is
tackled in the next section.
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193.3 Robustness analysis
Here we present additional evidence to examine the robustness of the results. First,
we check whether the results are robust to alternative variable deﬁnition or alternative
proxies. In particular, we introduce consumption per capita and long term interest rate
instead of GDP per worker and short term interest rate, respectively. Main conclusions
are maintained, see Table 4.
[insert table 4 around here]
Second, we control that results are not driven by omitted variables. Previous empirical
papers have shown that, even with the globalization of card use, diﬀerences among coun-
tries persist and this is due to diﬀerent demographic and cultural factors. In particular
we control for age, education, urban population, degree of innovation and crime. Some
studies show a negative relationship between card use and age, Wasberg et al. (1992).
To proxy for age, we introduce the percentage of school-age population (up to tertiary
education). We expect a positive relationship, the younger you are the more cash you
use. A low level of literacy and education may also be factors impinging on card use.
Carner and Luckett (1992) show a positive relationship between education and card use.
To proxy for education and literacy, we introduce the percentage of college graduates and
the books published scaled by population. Kaynak and Harcar (2001) claim that card
usage is more prevalent among urban and semi-urban areas. Traditional consumers who
reside in rural areas may still prefer cash transactions. Accordingly, we use the percentage
of urban population. More innovative societies are more willing to use new technologies,
and therefore new methods of payments will diﬀuse more rapidly, Humphrey (2010). To
proxy for innovation in society we use gross expenditure on research and development to
GDP. Humphrey et al. (1996) ﬁnd that the use of non-cash payment systems are related
to per capita income, the availability of new payment systems and also the prevalence of
violent crime within countries. Accordingly, we control for the level of criminality (total
number of violent crimes by population). Results are collected in Table 5. Looking at the
variables of interest, it can be observed that signs and signiﬁcance are unaltered through-
out alternative speciﬁcations, meaning that results of the analysis are robust. Looking
at the control variables introduced, there is mixed evidence. Age presents a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (column 1) meaning that the younger the population, the more cash
used. Education (graduates) aﬀects negatively and signiﬁcantly the cash use (column 3
and 4). Crime presents a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, meaning that the prevalence
of crime prevents card use (columns 11 and 12). On the other hand, the level of urban
population (columns 5 and 6) and expenditure on R&D (columns 9 and 10) present the
expected sign, more urban population and higher cultural level are associated to less cash
use, but are not signiﬁcant. Published books do not aﬀect cash use either (columns 7 and
8).
[insert table 5 around here]
An additional issue in this context is the simultaneous relationship between cash and
ATM (Snellman and Virén, 2006). To control for this potential bias, we use Generalized
14
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Table 4: Robustness analysis. Alternative variable definition. 
  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Atm -0.3542***    -0.4330***    -0.3542***   
  [0.0721]  [0.0741]    [0.0721]   
Eft-pos    -0.4574***   -0.5280***  -0.4574*** 
   [0.0606]   [0.0603]    [0.0606] 
Long  term  0.4914*** 0.2607*** 0.5391*** 0.2637**  0.4914***  0.2607*** 
Interest  rate  [0.0982] [0.0981] [0.1036]  [0.1026]  [0.0982]  [0.0981] 
Consumption  -1.6131*** -1.1100*** -1.5232*** -0.9652*** -1.6131*** -1.1100*** 
  [0.2665] [0.2667] [0.2805]  [0.2747]  [0.2665]  [0.2667] 
Accessing 0.9584***  0.7537***     0.9584***  0.7537*** 
 [0.2188]  [0.2020]      [0.2188]  [0.2020] 
Candidate    -0.4018  -1.7755*** -1.4020***  -2.3747*** 
      [0.2962] [0.3166]  [0.3624] [0.3455] 
Constant  11.6352*** 7.5486*** 12.0523***  8.7061***  13.0373***  9.9233*** 
  [2.5121] [2.4753] [2.4344]  [2.3091]  [2.3171]  [2.2436] 
Observations  168 168 168  168  168  168 
R2  0.65 0.67 0.66  0.68  0.65  0.67 
Hausman test 
  6.50 4.22 4.42  3.37  6.44  3.40 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
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Table 5: Robustness analysis. Control variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Atm  -0.3810***  -0.3911***  -0.3698***  -0.3558***  -0.3777***  -0.3513***  
  [0.0707]  [0.0745]  [0.0754]  [0.0745]  [0.0759]  [0.0727]  
Eft-pos   -0.4771***  -0.5048***  -0.4675***  -0.4592***  -0.4719***  -0.4195***
   [0.0581]  [0.0572]  [0.0573]  [0.0573]  [0.0596]  [0.0589] 
Interest rate  0.3339***  0.1802**  0.3051*** 0.1203* 0.3410***  0.1783**  0.3404*** 0.1794** 0.3417*** 0.1866** 0.2412***  0.1216 
  [0.0729] [0.0729] [0.0774] [0.0723] [0.0766] [0.0718] [0.0766] [0.0722] [0.0777] [0.0722] [0.0803] [0.0756] 
Gdp  -0.9114*** -1.0741*** -1.5936*** -0.9223*** -1.5615*** -1.0897*** -1.6754*** -1.1962*** -1.5396*** -1.1941*** -1.4307*** -1.1299***
  [0.3253] [0.2459] [0.2610] [0.2370] [0.2483] [0.2368] [0.2641] [0.2470] [0.2460] [0.2465] [0.2436] [0.2463] 
Accessing  1.0170*** 0.7363*** 0.9756*** 0.7503*** 0.9782*** 0.7563*** 0.9882*** 0.7576*** 0.9710*** 0.7610*** 0.7979*** 0.6683*** 
  [0.2127] [0.2053] [0.2201] [0.1962] [0.2250] [0.2019] [0.2230] [0.2020] [0.2259] [0.2020] [0.2258] [0.2043] 
Candidate  -0.5716 -2.2932***  -1.8797*** -2.1850*** -1.1823*** -2.0360*** -2.1172*** -1.9645*** -1.1833*** -1.8716*** -1.3412*** -2.3092***
  [0.3895] [0.3503] [0.4075] [0.3457] [0.3696] [0.3454] [0.3986] [0.3538] [0.3808] [0.3732] [0.3663] [0.3815] 
Education age  4.4351***  -0.1272            
Population  [1.2078]  [0.2224]            
Graduates     -0.2437*  -0.3083***         
     [0.1280]  [0.1109]          
Urban pop       -0.0425  -0.0808        
       [0.0867]  [0.0766]        
Publish_book         0.0042  0.0417      
         [0.0848]  [0.0748]      
R&D on gdp           -0.0034  -0.1120    
           [0.1728]  [0.1608]    
Crime             0.7380***  0.5442** 
             [0.2369]  [0.2400] 
Constant  -51.4940*** 12.5283*** 16.3451*** 10.3403*** 15.0393*** 11.9282*** 16.5165*** 12.0257*** 14.1927*** 11.5783*** 16.2229*** 13.5385***
  [18.3873]  [4.2239] [2.4765] [2.1756] [2.8737] [2.6538] [2.6791] [2.4678] [2.3483] [2.3688] [2.4105] [2.5248] 
Obs  168 168 167 167 168 168 168 168 168 168 166 166 
R2  0.62 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.63 
Hausman  test 19.69***  10.72  6.43 5.97 8.55 6.32  13.05**  16.27***  9.13  12.41**  11.70***  21.59*** 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
23 22Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Although the above mentioned simultaneity be-
tween cash and ATM can also be controlled by using a simultaneous equation estimator
(e.g., maximum likelihood and two- or three-stage least squares) our choice is based on
consistency concerns. In other words, the above mentioned estimators are more eﬃcient
than GMM, but they are not consistent since they do not eliminate unobservable hetero-
geneity. In contrast, GMM estimation implies less eﬃciency, but it is consistent because it
eliminates unobservable heterogeneity. Traditionally GMM uses ﬁrst-diﬀerence transfor-
mation. However, this technique has a weakness. It magniﬁes gaps in unbalanced panels
(Roodman, 2006). Arellano and Bover (1995) propose a second transformation ’orthog-
onal deviations’ that minimizes data loss and since lagged observations do not enter the
formula, they are valid as instruments.10 Since the sample is small, we decide to use this
transformation in order to preserve sample size. Further, to avoid over-ﬁtting, we collapse
the instrument matrix.11 Table 6 collects the results.
[insert table 6 around here]
Focusing ﬁrst on the diagnostic tests, Hansen’s J-statistics for all speciﬁcations are
too small to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Further, AR(1) and
AR(2) test statistics for ﬁrst and second order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
residuals indicate, as required, that while we can sometimes have evidence of ﬁrst order
autocorrelation, we always accept the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation.
Looking at the variables of interest, as it can be seen, results are very similar to those
presented in Table 3. ATM and EFT-POS aﬀect negatively and signiﬁcantly the cash
use. The institutional variables maintain the sign of the coeﬃcients, but there are some
diﬀerences with respect to the signiﬁcance found in Table 3. In particular, accessing
variable is only signiﬁcant when ATM are considered, meanwhile candidate is signiﬁcant
when EFT-POS are introduced instead. The most important diﬀerence is that interest
rate is no longer signiﬁcant. Taking into account endogeneity issues in the estimation,
the interest rate has negligible eﬀect on the cash to electronic payments ratio as the
main variable explaining its evolution is technology. Therefore, institutional variables
and technology applied to payment systems impact payment decisions, as suggested by
the model, and these results are robust to endogeneity.
From the time series analysis point of view some problems may arise in the results
found because part of the data may be non-stationary. Accordingly, that would give rise
to co-integration analysis and speciﬁcation of an error-correction model. We present a
battery of panel unit root tests (Table 7) and in all cases, unit root is rejected or there is
no conclusive evidence. Therefore, we consider that non-stationarity is not a concern in
our sample.
[insert table 7 around here]
10In the estimation, lagged values of cash, interest rate, GDP per worker and banking structure are
introduced in GMM-style, while ATM and EFT-POS receive the standard treatment for endogenous
variables. Further, time dummies are included as IV-style instruments.
11We have chosen not to run two-step GMM due to well-known ﬁnite sample problems associated with
the standard errors of two-step estimates. Indeed, two-step estimates of the model (not reported) suggest




Table 6: Robustness analysis: GMM analysis. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm  -0.71360***  -0.84260***  -0.71394***  
  [0.14098]  [0.13490]  [0.14138]  
Eft-pos   -0.89734***   -0.96071***   -0.89734***
   [0.12242]    [0.10414]    [0.12242] 
Interest  rate  0.12129  -0.21057 0.1998 -0.20509  0.12272  -0.21057 
 [0.20809]  [0.17895]  [0.22961]  [0.18193] [0.17120] [0.17895] 
Gdp -0.61756  0.33598  -0.30328  0.56391  -0.61613  0.33598 
 [0.61825]  [0.72778]  [0.59337]  [0.69849] [0.61204] [0.72778] 
Accessing 0.79053***  0.35058     0.78940***  0.35058 
  [0.25497]  [0.29204]    [0.28038]  [0.29204] 
Candidate    -0.97931  -3.77638*** -1.76008***  -3.90526***
     [0.71050]  [0.88164]  [0.68012]  [0.86343] 
Constant  3.93557 -5.22009 2.44620 -3.42433 5.68431 -1.31484 
 [6.25762]  [7.13449]  [5.52820]  [6.07819] [5.56999] [6.33952] 
Observations  168 168 168 168 168 168 
AR(1) -0.02  0.33  0.28  0.47  -0.03  0.33 
AR(2)  0.47 -0.93 0.48 -1.04 0.47 -0.93 
Hansen  test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
***, **, * significant at .01, .05 and .1 respectively. 
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Table 7: Summary of panel data unit root tests.  
 
 a. Cash over card use 
Method Statistic  P-value  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu   -3.8228  0.0001  11  132 
Breitung        
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -6.1142  0.0000  12  154 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr  53.5760  0.0005  12  144 
ADF-Choi test  -1.8686  0.0308  12  144 
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr    123.395  0.000  12  156 
PP-Choi test  -7.3738  0.000  12  156 
 
b. ATM 
Method Statistic  P-value  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu   -10.4013  0.000  8  103 
Breitung 0.6387  0.7369 12  154 
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -6.7945  0.000  12  154 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr  92.6257  0.000  12  154 
ADF-Choi Z test  -3.9890  0.000  12  154 
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr  105.95  0.000  12  156 
PP-Choi test  -4.1928  0.000  12  156 
 
c. EFT-POS 
Method Statistic  P-value  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu   -1.6607  0.048  8  103 
Breitung -3.2367  0.0006 12  135 
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -8.5380  0.000  12  144 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr  107.134  0.000  12  144 
ADF-Choi test  -7.3430  0.000  12  144 
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr  95.6011  0.000  12  156 
PP-Choi test  -6.7482  0.000  12  156 
 
d. Interest rate 
Method Statistic  P-value  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu   -4.5956  0.000  12  144 
Breitung 2.2510  0.9878 11  132 
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -0.3172  0.3755  12  144 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr  36.3442  0.0508  12  144 
ADF-Choi test  0-2.3712  0.0089  12  144 
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr  27.8613  0.1803  11  143 
PP-Choi test  2.2321  0.9872  12  156 
 
e. GDP 
Method Statistic  P-value  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu   -3.0398  0.0012  12  144 
Breitung 2.2873  0.9889 12  132 
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -2.6424  0.0041  12  150 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr  44.1657  0.0073  12  144 
ADF-Choi test  -2.9020  0.0019  12  144 
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr  60.9794  0.0000  11  143 
PP-Choi test  -3.8002  0.0001  12  156 
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We present a general equilibrium model on payment choice at retail level which allows
us to analyze the evolution of consumers’ payments when a country enters an economic
and monetary union. The model shows that the relative importance of cash to electronic
payments will depend on monetary policy and technology development. In the case of a
country accessing the economic union, the eﬀect will be based both on its own technology
level and also on the one of the accepting group. If the less developed economy gradually
adapts to the payment technology of the accepting countries, after the accession, the gap
between the consumers’ choices in both countries is diminishing over time.
The implications of the model are tested in the context of the European Union en-
largement process. This extension of the EU provides data on a natural (real) experiment
where the conclusions of the model can be examined. Results from the econometric analy-
sis are in line with the theoretical model. First, technology is the main factor driving the
consumers’ payment choice. In particular, technology development relative to the accept-
ing countries indicates that the closer the accessing payment technology to the European
one, the lesser use of cash. Second, when controlling for endogeneity issues, the interest
rate is not relevant in explaining the ratio of cash to electronic payments. This fact clearly
reinforces the role of technology in the analysis. Third, the variables that account for the
institutional environment are signiﬁcant, even when endogeneity issue is considered. The
expectation of accessing to the EU, together with the fact that the implementation of new
payment systems started before ﬁnally accessing the union, is considered a positive shock
for the reliability of the economic and payment systems and therefore, aﬀects payment
instrument choice. Our results are robust to diﬀerent estimation techniques, alternative
variable deﬁnition, diﬀerent accepting group and the introduction of additional controls.
This paper provides particular evidence for the case of payment systems and con-
sumers’ payment instrument choice. It is shown that by intensively adapting payment
technology to relatively higher standards, countries’ payment instrument use can be in-
ﬂuenced accordingly. This adaptation can be clearly favoured by the new institutional
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